报告题目：An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders
报告人：Zaifu Yang(杨再福) Chair Professor University of York, U.K.
时间：7月29日下午 15：30---17：30
地点：新主楼A928
主持人：李锐 教授
内容简介🥔：
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium typically fails to exist and furthermore no existing allocation mechanism can tackle this case. We propose the notion of an `equilibrium under allotment' to such markets and develop an ascending auction mechanism that always finds such an equilibrium assignment and corresponding price system in finitely many rounds. The auction can be viewed as an appropriate and proper generalization of the ascending auction of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor from settings without financial constraints to settings with financial constraints. We examine various properties of the auction and its outcome.
Zaifu Yang教授是国际经济学界的年轻知名学者之一。Zaifu Yang教授已经在经济学最顶尖的期刊Econometrica上发表论文两篇🧖🏿♂️；在 Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics等一流经济学期刊发表多篇论文。
